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DERIVATIVE SUIT

THE SHAREHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE SUIT AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
Prior to the recent United States Supreme Court decision
in Ross v. Bernhard,' the question of whether there is a constitutional right to trial by jury in a shareholders' derivative
suit had been, with one major exception,2 historically answered in the negative However, in Ross, the Court eschewed
the traditional view and held that the seventh amendment
guarantees a right to trial by jury in those derivative suits
where the corporation, had it been suing in its own right,
would have been entitled to a jury trial. 4 While the significance of Ross in the narrow field of derivative suits is hardly minor, its more general application to the elusive question of the constitutional right to trial by jury in civil actions
is of much greater importance. Ross, the latest of an unbroken
line of Supreme Court decisions, which collectively expand
the seventh amendment right to trial by jury,5 confirms the
Court's continuing reluctance to be bound by either procedural
or substantive doctrines which place a premium upon purely
historical considerations.6 Moreover, the logic of Ross and its
396 U.S. 531 (1970).
2 DePinto v. Provident Security Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826
1

(9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 950 (1964), critically
reviewed in Comment, The Right to Jury Trial in a StockhoZder's Derivative Action, 74 YALE L. J. 725 (1964).
3 13 W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 5931, 5990 (rev.
vol. 1961) [hereinafter cited as FLETcER]; 5 J. MOORiE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
38.38 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as

MooRE].
4 396 U.S. at 532-33.
The most important of which are Dairy Queen Inc. v. Wood,
369 U.S. 469 (1962) and Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,
359 U.S. 500 (1959).
6 But see FmD. R. Civ. P. 38 (a) stating that the right to trial
by jury "as declared by the seventh amendment ... shall
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post-1938 forerunners reveal an accelerated drive towards redefinition of the scope of the right to trial by jury, based
not upon elusive historical distinctions between law and
equity, but upon more substantive practical considerations.
Two primary reasons traditionally have been given for
the view that there is no right to trial by jury in a shareholders' derivative suit. First, application of the so-called
"historical test" indicates that the suit was not "a suit at common law" within the meaning of the seventh amendment. The
test embraces two distinct inquiries, an affirmative answer
to either of which compels acknowledgment of the parties'
right to jury trial: whether the particular action was recognized by the common law of England in 1791; and whether, although the action was in fact nonexistent either at law or
in equity in 1791, its nature is such that it would have been
recognized at common law had it in fact existed in 1791.7 A

negative response to the initial inquiry clearly is mandated
by the fact that the shareholders' derivative suit was not recognized even in equity until approximately 1830,8 at which
time it was independently recognized in both England and
the United States. 9 The second inquiry, as pertinent to the
derivative suit, also traditionally has been answered in the
negative, although the supportive reasoning often has been
be preserved to the parties inviolate." (emphasis added)
U.S. CONST. amend. VII states: "In suits at common law,

where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by jury, shall be otherwise reexamined by any Court
of the United States, than according to the rules of the
common law."
7 MooRE

38.05; see Comment, Declaratory Judgments-Jury

Trial-Identifying
"Legal" and "Equitable" Issues and
Mode of Trial of "Mixed" Issues, 45 Opx. L. REv. 210, 213
(1966).
8 Prunty, The Shareholders' Derivative Suit: Notes on Its
Derivation,32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 980, 994 (1957).
9 Id. at 993-94.
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less than persuasive.' 0 However, the basis of this answer is
identical with the second reason usually assigned for the view
that there is no right to jury trial in a shareholders' derivative suit-the belief that the equitable interest of the shareholder through which he is given standing to complain characterizes the entire suit as equitable.11 Thus, whether the suit
is described analytically as a singular equitable cause of action or as a combination of the respective claims of the shareholders and the corporation, 12 the entire suit is controlled by
the equitable nature of the shareholders' claims.
However, in Ross, several factors logically combined to
mandate the Court's rejection of historical principles as a
dialectic test of the nature of an action and its application
of a more practical "basic nature of the issue" test

3

of which

10 The source of the difficulty has been that theories most frequently advanced to explain the shareholders' derivative
suit have failed to account adequately for the mode of its
operation. See, e.g., Note, Stockholders' Suits in Behalf of
the Corporationfor Wrongs of the Directorsto the Corporation, 3 VA. L. REV. 62 (1915).
11Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548
(1949) in which the Court concluded:
Equity came to the relief of the stockholder, who
had no standing to bring civil action at law against
faithless directors and managers. Equity however, allowed him to step into the corporation's shoes and to
seek in its right the restitution he could not demand
in [sic.] his own.
See Comment, supra note 2, at 730.
12 These two views marked the fundamental difference between the logic applied by the Ross majority and that applied by the dissent. 396 U.S. at 545-49 (1970).
13 Though the Court adopted it in varied form, this test was
originally suggested by Professor Moore. MooRE 38.16. Although adopted by several courts in original form, Professor
Moore's test has been chiefly criticized for its failure to
provide guidelines for determination of the basic nature of
the issues. James, Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72
YALE L.J. 655, 691 (1963).
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historical considerations were only one aspect. 14 While the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure purported only to "preserve"' 5 the seventh amendment right to trial by jury, the
procedural changes thereby wrought clearly undercut the
basis of a portion of equity's concurrent jurisdiction with
law and thus effectuated a practical expansion of the jury
right. 6 Secondly, analysis of the nature of the derivative suit
indicated that earlier courts, with the exception of the Court
of appeals 7 for the Ninth Circuit had erred in their construction of the suit as a singular equitable cause of action.1 8 The
suit is actually dual in nature, embodying two claims-that
of the shareholders against the corporation and that of the
corporation against the third party defendant. 9
In support of this latter reasoning, which is itself indispensable to the holding in Ross, the court relied upon Koster
v. (American) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.,20 where TMr.
Justice Jackson said:
The cause of action which such a plaintiff brings
before the court is not his own but the corporation's.
It is the real party in interest and he is allowed to
act in protection of its interest somewhat as 'next
friend' might do for an individual,
because it is dis21
abled from protecting itself.
It will be noticed that the logic of this reasoning compels
the conclusion that the duality of the shareholder is horizontal
396 U.S. at 538 n.10.
11 FED. R. Civ. P. 38 (a).
16 James, supra note 13, at 688; Comment, supra note 2, at 736.
17 DePinto v. Provident Security Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826
(9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 950 (1964).
18 See, e.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 403 F.2d 909, 914 (2d Cir. 1968),
rev'd, 396 U.S. 531 (1970). See also 38 U. Cin. L. REv. 582,
584 (1969).
19 FLETCHER § § 5941.1, 5946, citing Taormina v. Taormina Corp.,
32 Del. Ch. 18, 78 A.2d 473 (Ch. 1951).
20 330 U.S. 518 (1947).
21 Id. at 522-23 (footnote omitted.).
14
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only, inasmuch as the shareholder's action is merely the means
to the assertion of the corporate claim. More specifically, the
remedy of the shareholder is the assertion of the corporate
claim.
While, from a practical viewpoint, the Koster logic may
suffice to surmise the result of a shareholder's derivative suit,
it is of little assistance in explaining the source of the shareholder's standing to assert a corporate cause of action. It
would appear that giving the shareholder standing to assert
a corporate claim runs afoul of traditional notions of the corporation's separate legal personality. 22 Conversely, if equity
looks behind the corporate form as a legal entity distinct
from its shareholders2 and thus grants the shareholder the
right to sue for an injury to the corporation or standing to
sue the third party defendant (in Ross, the directors of the
corporation) as a representative of the stockholders as a
class, 24 it is guilty of conveniently burying and resurrecting
the corporate form as matters of pure expediency. Specifically,
these latter two theories fail to account for the fact that the
corporation is a necessary party to the litigation;25 to compel
recognition of the corporation as a party to the action and
subsequently to deny its existence is non sequitur.
A solution to this dilemma, though hardly articulated by
either Koster or Ross, is apparent nevertheless in what is
perhaps the best description of the theory of the shareholders'
derivative suit:
The stockholders have a right in equity to compel
the assertion of a corporate right of action against
22

23
24

Moran v. Vreeland, 81 Misc. 664, 143 N.Y.S. 522, 526 (Sup.
Ct. 1913) is typical of the many state decisions which have
labored with the problem.
FLETCHER § 5945.
McLaughlin, The Mystery of the Representative Suit, 26
GEo. L.J. 878, 901 (1938).

25 FLETCHER

§ 5945.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1971

5

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 7 [1971], Iss. 1, Art. 3

TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 7, No. I

the directors or other wrongdoers when the corporation wrongfully refuses to sue. The suit is thus an
action for specific enforcement of an obligation owed
by the corporation to the stockholders to assert its
rights of action when the corporation has been put in
default by the wrongful refusal of the directors or
management to make [sic] suitable measures for its
protection. 26
Thus, the shareholder is not asserting any cause of action,
either his own or the corporation's, against the third party
defendant. Rather, the stockholder merely asserts his own
equitable right against the corporation, which actually is joined as a defendant. The corporation thereby is compelled to
enforce specifically its own rights and, as the real party at
interest, 27 is realigned fictionally as a plaintiff asserting the
corporate claim against the third party defendant. T h u s
analyzed, the duality of the shareholders' derivative suit is
patent; and, while it correctly may be said to rest upon a
fiction, that fiction is, at its essence, nothing other than that
of the corporation as a separate legal entity. Moreover, this
reasoning avoids the unfortunate gloss of Koster and offers
logical consistency, comporting perfectly with both the principle of separate corporate personality and historical standing
requirements.
The real need for a theoretically sound analysis of the
shareholders' derivative suit was not felt largely until the
Court was confronted with the issue in Ross-the constitutional right to trial by jury. A majority of the courts, which
previously had passed upon the issue, had conceived the suit
as a unitary equitable cause of action and, applying the standard historical test, had answered the question in the nega26 FLETCHER § 5941.1, at 414 (footnote omitted.), citing Ash-

wander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
v. (American) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S.
518, 522-23 (1947).

2T7Koster
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rive.28 However, application of the dual nature logic to the
jury issue manifestly yields the possibility of a contrary result. At common law, a corporation, suing a wrongdoer, enjoyed the right to trial by jury where an individual would
have enjoyed that right.20 Recognition of the dual nature of
the shareholders' derivative suit necessarily entails an understanding of the fact that it is the corporation which asserts
the corporate claim against the third party defendant. It follows that, as to an otherwise legal corporate claim in a shareholders' derivative suit, there is a right to trial by jury, unless the equitable claims of the shareholders control the entire action, thereby locating jurisdiction in equity and negating
the jury right.
Ross answered this question in the negative, holding that,
regardless of the source of the shareholder-plaintiff's standing, the right to trial by jury of a basically legal corporate
claim cannot be denied 30 In support of its decision, the Court
relied on the post-1938 construction of the right to trial by
jury as defined by Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover 3l and
32
Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood.
Examined collectively, Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen

80

Comment, supra note 2, at 730. Typical of the state court
decisions so holding is Molasky ex rel. Clayton Corp. v.
Lapin, 396 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965), cited in, Comment, Law or Equity: The Right to Trial by Jury in a Civil
Action, 35 Mo. L. REV. 43, 48 (1970) ("There is also no right
to a jury trial in a stockholders' derivative suit."); cf. Godfrey v. McConnell, 151 F. 783 (C.C.D. Mont. 1906)
Ross v. Bernhard, 396 I.S. 531, 534 & n.2 (1970).
Id. at 542.

31

359 U.S. 500 (1959).

32

369 U.S. 469 (1962).

28

29
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expressly rejected the equitable clean-up doctrine, 8 and Dairy
Queen held that "the constitutional right to trial by jury cannot be made to depend upon the choice of words used in the
pleadings" nor lost because historically legal issues were cast
as "incidental" to predominant equitable issues 4 As to factual
issues common to legal and equitable claims simultaneously
asserted and as to factual issues embraced solely by the legal
claim, the right to trial by jury cannot be destroyed by a
prior adjudication of the equitable claim except in the "most
imperative circumstances."3 5 This was the broad holding of
Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen from which the Ross decision apparently would follow.
However, Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen sprung from
the Court's termination of what had been a branch of equity's
concurrent jurisdiction with law,8 6 based on the procedural
merger of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As to the
shareholders' derivative suit, there had never been any concurrent jurisdiction whatsoever; rather, the suit historically
had been recognized only in equity.
Moreover, the factual basis of Beacon Theatres and of
33

The doctrine is explained in 1 J. STORY, Co umNTAPEs ON
EQUITY JuRISPRUDEcE § 71 (5th ed. 1849), cited in Com-

ment, Law or Equity, supra note 28, at 48 n.65.
Briefly stated equitable clean-up is the concept that if
a ground for equitable relief exists, equity will retain
jurisdiction to decide all issues of controversy between
the parties to the suit, including the purely legal issues involvd.
Comment, Law or Equity, supra, at 48 (footnote omitted.).
34 369 U.S. 469, at 477-78, 473.
85 Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510-11
(1959); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 472-73
(1962).
36 Comment, supra note 2, at 736.
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Dairy Queen differed markedly from that in Ross. 7 The former
cases involved combinations of historically separable legal
and equitable causes of action, while the dual elements of
the shareholders' derivative suit were separable for analytical
purposes only. Thus, the former cases presented instances of
vertical duality in the sense that multiple independent claims
were asserted by two parties, each respectively against the
other. But the duality of the shareholders' derivative suit is
horizontal - shareholders suing the corporation, the corporation suing directors.
Thus, as the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit displayed,88 it is clearly possible to distinguish both the facts
and the objectives of Ross from those of Beacon Theatres and
Dairy Queen. However, the broad language of Beacon Theatres
and Dairy Queen indicates that the Court intentionally was
driving its holding beyond the factual issues presented.89
Therefore, it is not so clear that the holdings in Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen can be distinguished from that in Ross.
Perhaps the underlying significance of Beacon Theatres was
articulated best by Professor Rothstein when he said that the
Supreme Court, in Beacon Theatres, was announcing a new
approach to the problem of the right to jury trial, but that
In Beacon Theatres, plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction; defendant counter-claimed alleging
violation of antitrust laws and sought treble damages. In
Dairy Queen, plaintiff alleged breach of contract and trademark infringement and sought temporary and permanent
injunctions and an accounting. Defendant answered by
denying breach of contract and alleging laches and estoppel
and plaintiff's violation of antitrust laws. In each case, it
was the defendant who demanded jury trial and the plaintiff who objected.
88 Ross v. Bernhard, 403 F.2d 909 (2nd Cir. 1968), rev'd, 396
U.S. 531 (1970).
80 Comment, supra note 2, at 735-36.
87
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Beacon Theatres was unfortunately a poorly chosen occasion
for its enunciation.40
Attempts to distinguish Ross from Beacon Theatres and
Dairy Queen based on the practical inseparability of the dual
elements of the shareholders' derivative suit result in the drawing of a difference without a distinction.4 For the Ross logic
never was intended to rest upon the narrow determinations of
the precise legal issues in Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen,
but upon the broader mandate of the Court's drive toward
redefinition of the right to trial by jury in the wake of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Viewed against this background, Ross thus properly should be regarded not as an unwarranted extension of the right to trial by jury,42 but as
merely a confirmation of the principles first espoused in
Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen.
However, even after admitting that there may be a right
to trial by jury in the shareholders' derivative suit, a question
remains as to the existence of the right in each shareholders'
derivative suit. Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen, applied to
the shareholders' derivative suit, indicate that a right to trial
by jury on the corporate claim cannot be lost merely because
the source of the shareholders' standing may be equitable.
Thus, the sole remaining issue is whether the corporate claim
is legal or equitable in nature. The Ross Court answered this
question by adopting a "basic nature of the issue" test which
"is determined by considering, first, the pre-merger custom
with reference to such questions; second, the remedy sought;
and, third, the practical abilities and limitations of juries. '43
Ths test is applied directly to the corporate claim, rather than
to the shareholders' derivative suit as a unitary action.
Rothstein, Beacon Theatres and the Constitutional Right
to Jury Trial, 51 A.B.A.J. 1145, 1148 (1965).
41 Contra, Comment, supra note 2, at 736.
42 Contra, Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 543-45
(1970)
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
43 396 U.S. at 538 n.10.
40
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In Ross, the defendants were the Lehman Corporation, the
plaintiffs-shareholders' closed-end investment company, various individual directors of the corporation and various members of Lehman Brothers, an investment banking firm acting
as broker for defendant corporation. It was alleged specifically
that more than one half of the board of directors of the Lehman
Corporation was affiliated with Lehman Brothers, in violation
of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 44 and that this illegal
control had been used to extract excessive brokerage fees
from the Corporation. Directors of the Corporation were accused of breaches of fiduciary duty, gross abuse of trust, misconduct, willful misfeasance, gross negligence and breach of
the brokerage contract between Lehman Brothers and the
Corporation. The remedy sought was an accounting for and
payment to the Corporation of any profits and gains made
by the individual defendants and for any losses sustained by
the Corporation. Applying Dairy Queen, the Supreme Court
held that, although the remedy sought was framed as an equitable remedy, it should be construed as a prayer for money
damages. 45 Moreover, although equitable claims likewise were
asserted, minimal requirements necessitated a trial by jury on
the legal claims-negligence and breach of contract, because
the operative facts and allegations did not surpass the practical
capabilities of the jury.40 Therefore, application of the three
criteria of the basic nature of the issue test to the corporate
claim compels recognition of the right to trial by jury.
Carrying this line of reasoning to its logical conclusion, the
Court, through Mr. Justice White, said:
The historical rule preventing a court of law from entertaining a shareholder's suit... is obsolete; it is no
longer tenable for a district court, administering both
law and equity in the same action, to deny legal
remedies to a corporation, merely because the cor4 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to-52 (1964).
46

46

396 U.S. at 542.

Id. at 539-42.
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poration's spokesmen are its shareholders rather than
its directors.4 7
The logic behind this reasoning as to remedies also may be
applied to the right to jury trial. For ff the corporation, on its
own initiative, had brought suit against third party wrongdoers, not necessarily its directors, there unquestionably would
have been a right to trial by jury as to legal claims asserted.
Aside from the obvious opportunities otherwise open to deprive the third party defendant of his jury right,48 it legitimately may be contended that the right to trial by jury on a
corporate claim should not depend upon whether it is the
corporation's directors or its shareholders who are ultimately
responsible for the assertion of a claim which in fact belongs
to the corporation.
The greater significance of Ross lies beyond its impact
upon derivative suits. Since the adoption of the Equity Rules
of 1912, the Supreme Court has moved steadily toward the
procedural merger of law and equity,49 a merger which most
nearly reached final culmination in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 50 With this amalgamation has come a federal doctrine which emphasizes substance over procedural form, to
which no fact bears greater testament than the one form of
action mandate of Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 51 Yet it is clear that, so long as the seventh amendment
retains its vitality as a Don Quixote from the past resurrect47
48

Id. at 540.
Both the Ross majority and dissent relied on Fleitmann v.
Welsbach St. Lighting Co., 240 U.S. 27 (1916), wherein Mr.
Justice Holmes recognized the obvious opportunity for
fraud. But see Glenn, The Stockholder's Suit-Corporate
and Individual Grievances, 33 YALE L.J. 580, 582 (1924).

49 Moopx

38.05.

50 Address by Professor Sunderland, The New Federal Rules,
delivered at the fifty-fourth annual meeting of the West
Virginia Bar Association, at White Sulphur Springs, West
Virginia, Aug. 20, 1938, 45 W. VA. L.Q. 5, 7-8 (1938).
r1 FED. R. Civ. P. 2 states: "There shall be one form of action
to be known as 'civil action'."
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ing the ghosts of the long buried forms of action to haunt
modern federal practice, procedural merger can reach final
consummation by moving in but one direction, expansion of
the right to trial by jury.52 Thus, where a choice has lain between expansion or contraction of the jury right, as often it
must, if emphasis is placed on substance rather than form, the
Supreme Court uniformly has chosen expansion. 53
The historical test therefore necessarily has become a
casualty of the Court's policy of preference for trial by jury.
No longer can historical distinctions between law and equity
be used as a definitive test of the jury right. The real question
has become whether, as to a particular issue, there should or
should not be a right to trial by jury, 4 the determinants of
which are the criteria of the Ross basic nature of the issue
test, the first of which incorporates both elements of the historical test. The fact that the Court's new test purports to
retain the law-equity distinction as dispositive of the right to
trial by jury is a product of the fact that the language of the
seventh amendment cannot be totally ignored. However, in
Ross, the Court affected a redefinition of the terms 'qegal" and
"equitable", such that historical considerations now serve only
to set a minimum as to those issues which will be recognized
as embraced by the former term. The result is an avoidance of
the exclusive effect which the seventh amendment formerly
was interpreted as having on the right to trial by jury and a
reconciliation of that amendment with the needs of post-merger
practice. Moreover, it correctly may be said that the decision
in Ross moves the Court one step closer to final consummation
of the procedural merger toward which the law is tending.
John J. Barnhardt,III
52 Thirteen states have allowed a trial by jury in "equity"
cases. See Van Hecke, Trial by Jury in Equity Cases, 31
N.C.L. REv. 157, 158 (1953).
r3 McCoid, Right to Jury Trial in the Federal Courts, 45 IowA
L. REv. 726, 742 (1960).
r4 Address by Professor Sunderland, supra note 50, at 7-8; See
also McCaskill, Jury Demands in the New Federal Procedure, 88 U. PA. L. REv. 315, 318 (1940).
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